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Summary
Should Croatia focus significant efforts of its foreign policy towards neighbou-
ring countries and their accession process to the EU membership? Could the 
potential turn towards pro-active politics of helping Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia and Montenegro in the EU accession process actually become one of 
the key actions in establishing Croatia as an important new EU member that 
can act in the mutual and long-term interest of the Union? Possible strong 
co-operation of Croatia with other Western Balkan states in their accession 
process could be one of the most beneficial potential mid-term goals for Cro-
atian foreign policy. Such theoretical focus-shift could become the impetus of 
establishing itself as a desired role of a regional leader on a long-term basis 
– especially considering the policies of the EU and the USA with their vision 
of the future of the South Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans in the 
forthcoming decade. Unilateral policies towards neighbouring candidate co-
untries, as displayed by Slovenia towards Croatia during its accession process, 
should be absolutely ruled out for the sake of Croatia’s own interest. Delibera-
tely avoiding any similarities with the negative image attained by Slovenia be-
cause of the way it has treated the Croatian accession process, Croatia should 
present itself as a problem-solver and not a problem-maker – which will be the 
best long-term strategy in positioning the country on the new global map that 
will be established once the current EU crisis ends and further enlargement 
becomes the focus of the EU once again.
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In the summer of 2013, Croatia became the 28th member of the European Union. 
It took two decades after becoming a new sovereign country with the intention of be-
coming part of the European family from the very first moment of its independence 
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to finalize the accession – in which process more than a full decade was dedicated to 
meeting the conditions for membership. That goal – often seen as the very finale of the 
third phase of Croatian foreign policy implementation (Jović, 2011:8-14) – has largely 
shaped the focus of Croatian foreign policy in the past ten years. Despite numerous ob-
stacles, many of which were reasoned by domestic policy issues and non-constructive 
behaviour of domestic policy actors, Croatia has entered the EU family of states on July 
1, 2013. 
The moment of 2013 Croatian EU accession is dramatic – the ongoing financial 
crisis and its repercussions have increased the pace of transition of the EU towards 
the “state of imbalance” (Toje, 2010:3).1 The limitation of potential new foreign-policy 
chances and developments imposed by the ongoing crisis and the change of focus of 
major EU countries towards solving the flaming economy issues, where new problems 
of new members can only be seen as an unwanted distraction, opens up a new possi-
bility for Croatia: to change the way it approaches the region and to develop a new 
mid-term strategy in order to gain maximum from its new, strengthened position as 
a full EU member. Positioning itself as a leader in regional multilateral cooperation 
and establishing itself as a country that can be of constructive help to the EU to solve 
the other great problem – the Challenge of the Balkans (Rupnik, 2009:4)2 – can make 
a significant positive impact on Croatia’s position within the EU and the international 
system in the years to come.
As a member, Croatia will have to alter its objectives and priorities towards other EU 
members and do whatever it can to establish itself as a recognizable, constructive and 
lucrative EU state. Foreign policy will be one of the main pillars of such establishment 
and the forthcoming period will be crucial for the shaping of Croatian image within 
the EU family. In shaping the scholar framework of the future development of Croatian 
policy Dejan Jović outlines one of the main dilemmas: should Croatia follow its own 
course of foreign policy or should it primarily take into account the mutual interest of 
the Union by incorporating its goals and specific national interests into the boundaries 
of the mutual EU foreign policy?3 Although the establishment of EU Common Forei-
gn and Security Policy (CFSP) has produced great results in creating a more unified 
perspective for issues such as security and defence diplomacy,4 the actual creation of 
a unified foreign policy of the EU remains a goal yet to be met. Asle Toje observes the 
1 In his assessment of the recent state of the international system Toje questions the shapes of the new 
multipolarity where Europe will again become dependent on the US.
2 Rupnik concludes how, for the EU, the Balkans requires rethinking of its concept of enlargement, which 
cannot be a replica of the pattern successfully implemented in Central Europe.
3 ibid.
4 At this moment there are 15 ongoing worldwide CFSP missions and 11 that are completed over the 
course of 10 years. 
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ongoing inability of the EU to create any kind of comprehensive foreign policy for time 
to come, where the EU “has the interests of a great power but the dependency and ca-
pacity of a small power, with the fact that Europe’s security obligations have grown to 
be increasingly disproportional to its ability to live up to them”. Imposing the idea of the 
EU as a small power, he highlights the new future of EU foreign policy as dependent on 
the US mainly because Toje describes how the “external policies of the EU have failed 
to live up to the expectations. The Europeans have failed to integrate their foreign po-
licy outlooks, aspirations and capabilities” (Toje, 2010).5 
The current focus of the leading EU members towards solving the dangerous and 
frightening outcomes of the economic crisis – that is, the undermining of the future of 
the EU at this very moment (Levy, 2012)6 – outlines the moment of Croatia’s accession. 
Croatia has joined the EU at its most problematic moment in history, where there is 
no real place for exercising the potential boundaries of foreign policy acting as a new 
member. For the first time after 1981 there is only one country joining the EU in the 
enlargement and at this moment there are no real announcements about potential da-
tes for a next enlargement process. Even the most optimistic analysts are conservative 
towards any date prior to 2018 for any of either candidates or potential candidate co-
untries (with the only possible exception of Iceland). And all of that will put Croatia in 
a very delicate position. From one perspective, the current focus of the EU is solving 
the problems of the economic crisis that threatens the very foundation of the Union, 
and the accession of Croatia will probably be seen as formally positive and important, 
but it probably will not be a matter of real focus of the EU leaders. On the other hand, 
Croatia has to adapt to a new system and start capitalizing over its new status of an EU 
member as fast as it can, and in all fields imaginable – with foreign policy as one of the 
main fields. 
During that period of adaptation and the beginning of a new phase of its foreign 
relations as a modern state, Croatian foreign policy actors should take a few important 
issues into consideration: firstly, the EU has a long-term plan of accessing all ex-Yugo-
slav countries to the Union.7 Secondly, the US has a strong long-term impetus towards 
remaining a visible and an active actor in South Eastern Europe and it will further stren-
5 Toje also debates about a potential point of “return to history”.
6 As Lévy pointed out in his September 2012 open letter in front of European intellectuals: “Either Eu-
rope takes one more step, passing a mark in the path to this political integration without which no 
single currency will succeed in enduring, or it leaves History and sinks into chaos. We no longer have 
a choice – it is political union or death.”
7 In his latest speech at the EPP Group conference “Western Balkans: A future with Europe” in Brussels, 
Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy outlined how “for all 
the countries of the Western Balkans, important milestones on the European path are within reach, if 
the conditions are met”. 
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gthen its position in the Western Balkans, which is a very important development for 
the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo.8 And thirdly, 
the behaviour of Slovenia during the Croatian accession process – especially the border 
and maritime disputes from 2008 and 2009 as well as recent development of the pro-
blem of Ljubljanska banka – has been seen by the EU as deeply problematic unilateral 
behaviour of one EU member towards the accessing member. Although there were 
no official EU Council statements regarding 2013 Slovenia’s threats ratifying Croatian 
treaty for EU accession, many European politicians and members of the EU Parliament 
clearly highlighted how Slovenia’s unilateral policy was not welcome in the EU. At the 
very peak of EU’s pressure, Hannes Swoboda, the President of the deputy group of the 
Socialists and Democrats (S&D) in the European Parliament, said in Koper: “There 
has not been an example in the last decades of a country that went through accession 
talks and got broad support but then saw its accession hindered by one member state. 
The EU expects Slovenia and Croatia to deal with their open issues in a way that will 
not hinder the ratification of Croatia’s accession treaty. The responsibility of politicians 
should be to make sure that things go in that direction regardless of their domestic 
political situation. If Slovenia failed to ratify Croatia’s treaty, this would be bad not only 
for the EU and Croatia, but also for Slovenia.” Elmar Brok, the chairman of the Europe-
an Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, was cited on the same subject in leading 
European media: “It is completely unacceptable to hold up the expansion process with 
such bilateral problems.” Slovenia’s doings were not overlooked nor ignored.
When observed within the same framework, those three issues share one similar 
outset: they can be seen as a foundation for establishing a theoretical context of a futu-
re Croatian foreign policy within the EU, focused on proactive work towards helping 
neighbouring countries actually become EU members from its own, almost a decade 
long experience – which could greatly benefit Croatia’s newfound image and its positi-
on within the EU and the international community. 
And for Croatia, there is much of the international image left to be desired. As 
described by Subotić and Zarakol: “When a country is chastised by other internatio-
nal actors, the state identity is threatened because modern states derive part of their 
legitimacy from their ability to gain recognition and respect on the international stage. 
This means that the international criticism cannot be brushed off easily, without re-
imagining the national identity in some way.” In the same paper they challenge the 
interesting field of cultural intimacy of states with a case-study of Croatia as a country 
hindered by what they call a state of embarrassment (Subotić and Zarakol, 2011:13-15). 
8 In his address from October 2012, Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Bureau of European 
and Eurasian Affairs, stated how “the strength of our [US] engagement with the [Western Balkan] re-
gion [...] has never been clearer than it was in the last several months”. 
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Although domestic actors tend to avoid such notions deliberately, it is very visible – 
even on the example of the EU accession process – that many complaints and obstacles 
Croatia faced were in fact the result of its behaviour during the last two decades.9 New 
potential focus, towards becoming a leading integrative force within the region, would 
also dramatically help in building a whole new international recognition of Croatia. 
However, such focusing would not be easy because of specific relations and various un-
solved disputes with the neighbouring countries nor would it come without obstacles 
in the domestic field.
From a declarative point of view, the Croatian policy elite already advocates the EU 
(and NATO) enlargement to all countries of South Eastern Europe and especially the 
Western Balkans, with a strong emphasis on their accession being the Croatian national 
interest (Jović, 2012). In December 2012 meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brusse-
ls, Croatian foreign policy minister said – regarding three of the four aspiring countries 
from the region; Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia – how “Croatia 
plays an important role here, as we believe that NATO membership contributes to the 
stabilization of the region”.10 The January 2013 meeting of Croatian and Serbian prime 
ministers in Belgrade is also a showcase of such supportive actions where Croatian PM 
stated how “Serbia would have a more difficult EU pathway than Croatia” and urged 
Serbia to ask for help, adding that “Croatia will be fair”.11 And the latest, in March 2013 
Croatian President directly addressed the issues of cooperation with neighbouring co-
untries once Croatia becomes a EU member, saying how “Croatian borders will not be-
come a Great Wall of China for the neighbouring countries”, with a special emphasis on 
economic cooperation.12 In the same speech Josipović highlighted Croatian strategic 
goals for the forthcoming future, including Croatia’s intentions of becoming a “small 
power”, which can be seen as one of the possible strategic goals for the fourth era of 
Croatian foreign policy, as well as further strengthening of the “strategic alliance with 
the US” (Jović, 2011).
There are two groups of potential obstacles on the path to full policy of cooperati-
on and consensus with neighbouring countries striving towards the EU membership: 
9 Some authors often go even further in order to present the alleged wrongdoings of Croatia, all the way 
to WWII and the establishment of NDH, which is absolutely malevolent because of the clear separation 
from that period of Croatian “statehood” – which was actually severely limited from the perspective 
of actual sovereignty – in the Croatian Constitution itself and behaviour of all relevant modern policy 
actors in Croatia.
10 Cited from the official press-release of Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
11 Milanović deliberately went even further with a direct call to cooperation. Citing: “Come to us for help. 
We will be fair and you will see that it will be so. Croatia will do its best without an ulterior motive.” 
Such discourse is new in Croatian-Serbian relations and was met with great interest in Serbia.
12 Excerpts from Ivo Josipović’s speech at the Faculty of Law in Split
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possible backfires on domestic policy field and a vast number of unsolved bilateral 
disputes Croatia has within the region. As pre-2013 scholar works on the subject of the 
position Croatia should take towards neighbouring countries once it becomes a EU 
member (and especially towards Serbia) pointed out, the true challenge for Croatian 
foreign policy actors was the gain of an appropriate domestic support towards proacti-
ve and constructive behaviour within the region. Jović pointed out how “[Croatian na-
tionalists] will almost certainly oppose any further softening of the EU border, because 
it is the border that divides Europeans from the Others, in particular from Bosnians 
and Serbs, who should – according to Croatian nationalists – be kept permanently out 
of Europe”. However, in the very conclusion he predicts a drastic change of expected 
nationalist narrative due to “deep political and cultural changes that EU membership 
brings” (Jović, 2011:33).13 In his other analysis Jović points out that “discussions within 
domestic policy field will be made on new lines of separation – on one side there will be 
those who expect EU membership to be used as an instrument to fight unilateral policy 
in order to meet some nationalistic goals (especially towards the neighbouring countri-
es), and on the other there will be the advocates of further harmonization with the EU 
goals in order to strengthen the Union” (Jović, 2011). Tvrtko Jakovina points out how 
Croatia faced an “isolation towards eastern neighbours with its constant escaping the 
connotation of Western Balkans”, which was mainly attributed to “the psychological 
issues that Croats (or policy actors) cannot accept related to the (geographical) position 
in the region” (Jakovina, 2010:89).
Surprisingly, the recent initiatives towards greater cooperation by the main Croa-
tian foreign policy actors – as described before – did not face negative reactions from 
Croatian conservatives and have not been met by any substantial backslash from natio-
nalistic domestic parties. The reasons for such normative acceptance can be seen from 
the prism of realism and political pragmatism: even the Croatia’s biggest conservative 
party, HDZ, has a long-term strategy of being accepted as a pro-European party that 
supports all the EU (and also US) foreign policy goals. At the same time HDZ is cu-
rrently preparing for domestic regional elections and it also expects to win the upco-
ming parliamentary elections in 2015. Knowing how Croatian domestic policy is under 
strict observance of European policy actors – and knowing how the Slovenian unilate-
ral actions and reactions towards Croatia produced a sincere concern over Janša’s go-
vernment in Brussels – HDZ has almost completely abandoned the somewhat expected 
nationalism paradigm. Although some could expect negative rhetoric over normatively 
liberal positions of social-democrats regarding the new phase of Croatian foreign po-
13 As Jović concludes, “Once the country joins the EU, these same people, the elite and voters alike, will 
try to exploit the EU in an effort to disassociate Croatia from the remaining Balkans, namely from 
Serbia, first and foremost, but also from Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
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licy, the results of research on EU-related attitudes of political parties in Croatia (and 
Serbia) from 2012 have shown that even the conservative and nationalists parties are 
supporters of the EU integration processes (Stojić, 2012). Even more so, HDZ shifted 
towards expressing an undisputed support towards a constructive multilateral regional 
policy of Milanović’s government.14 Such development is a clear showcase that one of 
the possible obstacles towards a proactive policy in the region has been potentially 
ruled out.15
The real challenges in the domestic policy field will come with the actual beginning 
of the accession process of neighbouring countries for the same reasons Slovenia offici-
ally disputed the Croatian accession – various political and border (territory) disputes. 
Constructive solving of these disputes will be the main Croatian test polygon for both 
domestic and foreign policy actors. 
In the final months prior to the accession, in March 2013, Croatia solved only some 
of the numerous disputes or issues it has with its neighbours. A recent dispute with 
Slovenia about Ljubljanska banka has been successfully solved in a bilateral agreement 
(thus removing the normative obstacle to ratify the accession treaty expressed by Slo-
venia) but questions of Krško nuclear plant and ongoing border disputes in both land 
and sea, where Croatia and Slovenia are engaged in a legal battle over border disputes 
at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague that should be finalized either in 
late 2014 or in early 2015, remain unsolved. 
The question of borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina will be one of the key challen-
ges, because of the actual length of the border (over 1000 kilometres with 50 or even 60 
border crossings of various categories) and its implications on Croatia being a member 
of the EU. The finalization of the agreement on a special border regime with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was the main topic of the trilateral Croatia-BiH-European Commission 
meeting held in Brussels in February 2013. The regime will tackle many of the potential 
problems regarding border regime and will stay in force until BiH meets the require-
ments of becoming a full EU member. The bilateral and multilateral mechanisms over 
the forthcoming issues regarding the economy, transport and the regime for people 
with dual citizenship are already on the way, but potentially sensitive disputes over 
small islands of Veliki and Mali Škoj or bordering over river Una in Hrvatska Kostaj-
nica and BiH Kostajnica will remain problematic – especially because of the complex 
policy situation within Bosnia and Herzegovina and the call for almost different foreign 
14 Commenting on the meeting of Milanović and Dačić in Belgrade, HDZ president Tomislav Karamarko 
highlighted how “good relations are an impetus for both Croatia and Serbia. The ice on the relations has 
to melt”.
15 With the 2012 ICTY verdict of acquittal of Gotovina and Markač and public expressions of Gotovina 
on the need to get over the past and turn to the future in the region, the majority of Croatian conserva-
tive voters shifted their views towards the EU and Serbia in particular. 
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policies when talking to Sarajevo or Banja Luka. There are also questions of regime over 
Ploče harbour as well as an ongoing debate over Croatia’s intention to build the Pelješac 
Bridge. 
Border issues with Montenegro are related to the land and maritime border over 
Prevlaka and have been often used in disputes between both countries and often in 
the domestic policy field. At the moment of writing this article, the silent diplomacy 
of both sides is at work on the Prevlaka dispute. There is no public information about 
the current state of agreements but Montenegrin domestic policy has been attacked by 
nationalist parties accusing government of “selling Prevlaka to Croatia”.16 
The recent acceleration of Croatian foreign policy can be observed in convergence 
regarding disputes with Serbia. Croatia and Serbia have the greatest number of various 
issues on the table: the refugee issue, the issue of their property, housing rights, the post-
war missing persons, war crime trials, and mutual suits before the International Court 
of Justice, pensions, company assets and disputes over succession after the breakup of 
Yugoslavia. Border (territory) disputes are also present, mainly over bordering at the 
river Danube, where both sides are pursuing their own rights over the line where state 
borders should be negotiated.17 It has to be noted that Croatian foreign policy actors 
have already commenced a strategy of downplaying border disputes as something that 
should not be an obstacle in the newly found cooperation between the two countries. 
Speaking about the Danube Croatian president Josipović highlighted how “Croatia will 
not abuse its (EU) status to solve bilateral problems and disputes with its neighbours” 
and “will not stand in the way of Serbia’s EU integration over an unresolved border 
dispute along the Danube”.18 Further progress in bilateral policy has been achieved in 
March 2013 when Foreign Affairs Minister Vesna Pusić met with the Serbian Foreign 
Minister Ivan Mrkić in Zagreb over the agreement on the mixed commission for out-
standing issues between the two countries.19 The other highly controversial issue has 
been tackled at the same meeting, the mutual genocide suits before the International 
16 In 2009 both sides agreed on the preparation of documents for bilateral expert groups in order to solve 
the Prevlaka dispute which still has its foundations in the December 2002 Agreement on Temporary 
Protocol for Prevlaka Peninsula. In February 2013 Montenegrin Democratic Front Party raised the 
question of the status of Prevlaka negotiations, calling the former prime minister and the minister of 
foreign affairs Igor Lukšić to “give answers about the nature of official platform used for solving the 
dispute with Croatia”.
17 Both analysts and scholars agree how border issue with Serbia will probably not be solved through bi-
lateral negotiations and will ultimately call for arbitration, in a similar way to the dispute with Slovenia.
18 More at the cited Balkansight link in References
19 After the meeting Pusić said how “[Croatian] job is to work on the issues left over from the past, the 
present issues and the changes stemming from our entry into the EU, i.e. our leaving CEFTA. But geo-
graphically, we will stay right here, and relations with our neighbors are extremely important”.
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Court of Justice. Pusić and Mrkić expressed a readiness to commence talks regarding 
the issue of bilateral withdrawal of lawsuits in the future.20 
Related to politics or to territory, every example of bilateral issues is also highly sen-
sitive within the field of domestic policy – and theoretically, any of the aforementioned 
disputes could be used as a potential field for exercising theoretical unilateral policy of 
Croatia in the years to come. Successful and constructive solving of those issues will 
be the main challenge for both Croatia as an EU member, as well as for the political 
actors of neighbouring countries waiting for their membership – especially in the light 
of a strong EU and US joint support to all the Western Balkan countries on their way 
towards Euro-Atlantic integrations (Jović, 2012:209).21
In 2003 the European Council established the foundation for the integration of We-
stern Balkan countries as EU priority during the European Council summit in The-
ssaloniki. In 2005 relations between states have been moved from Directorate General 
for External Relations (DG RELEX) to Directorate General for Enlargement policy se-
gment, which was a direct consequence of the advancement of the Stabilization and 
Association Process within the region. At this moment Serbia and Montenegro have 
the status of official candidates for accession, while Bosnia and Herzegovina is waiting 
for the application clearance upon the conclusion of an association agreement.22 
In describing the 2013 European perspective for Western Balkans, Štefan Füle, Eu-
ropean Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, presented a wide 
overview of goals to be met by both the EU and the candidate countries. Keeping the 
momentum for enlargement has been presented as crucial, together with vigorous pur-
suit of the reforms necessary for progress on the path towards the EU.23 He said that, 
“at the same time, taking account of the major challenges facing the European Union, 
enlargement policy should reflect a prudent, cautious approach based on strict conditi-
onality”. And the aforementioned “conditionality” has bilateral issues in its very centre.
20 They concluded how “this topic would be discussed after the previous issues, such as the missing per-
sons issue and the processing of war crimes, were resolved”.
21 Jović argues how the EU has to learn from Croatian accession if it really wishes to secure a permanent 
peace in the Balkans. He advises a policy of further inclusion without which the Bosnians and Serbians 
would feel more isolated than they were before Croatia began its accession to the EU. 
22 Macedonia and Turkey are the other countries from the wider region that also have a candidate status 
(as well as Iceland in Northern Europe), while Albania has not yet been recognized as an official candi-
date. Kosovo still have to receive an approval for negotiating their specific Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA) in order to even apply for membership.
23 He has also highlighted the importance of “the promotion of economic and financial stability and 
supporting increased trade and business opportunities in the aspiring countries as of utmost mutual 
interest since it translates into growth and more jobs – which are the long-term prerequisites for sta-
bility and prosperity”, from Štefan Füle January 2013 Brussels EPP Group conference speech “Western 
Balkans: A future with Europe”.
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Füle was very direct in the notion that the EU does not want major bilateral issues to 
be imported into the European Union and how the EU does not want bilateral “mines” 
to explode in the middle of the accession process (Grabbe, Knaus and Korski, 2010:5).24 
He has highlighted the Croatian and Slovenian disputes as the ones solved with the help 
of the European Union and proposed mechanisms of arbitration or the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague as ways to handle bilateral issues in the future. Temporal 
framework has also been proposed with the conclusion that it is “the most important 
that in 2013 this issue (of solving bilateral disputes) be made acknowledged as a major 
element of good neighbourly relations, a principle to which we will refer more and 
more as we move ahead. And it is important that we start to tackle these issues so that 
they do not hold up the accession process”.
At the very end of his address, Füle outlined the official position of the European 
Commission regarding the potential enlargement for every country of the region by 
concluding whether sufficient progress has been made, the member states “will consi-
der whether to open the accession negotiations with Serbia and with the former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia, and whether to approve a mandate to start negotiations 
with Kosovo on the Stabilization and Association Agreement. Depending on progress, 
a report on Albania is also possible, while the prospect of a credible membership appli-
cation from Bosnia and Herzegovina remains open. In 2013, [EC] also looks forward 
to the advancement of accession negotiations with Montenegro and progress in the visa 
dialogue with Kosovo. For all the countries of the Western Balkans, important milesto-
nes on the European path are within reach, if the conditions are met”.25
At the same time, the US foreign policy continues to see the Western Balkans and 
South-Central Europe as an area of priority for the United States government. In his 
speech at the Washington Press Center in 2012, Ambassador Philip Reeker, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, highlighted various fiel-
ds of US interest for every country of the region, with special notion regarding Croatian 
success of EU accession, saying that “Croatia is a strong leader in the region and sets 
an example for other countries in the region to remind us of the hard work it takes, but 
indeed the benefits accrue as countries move forward in the accession track and the 
integration track”. Serbian candidate status and Kosovo’s Stabilization and Association 
Agreement have been characterized as “beneficial not only for those countries, but for 
the entire region”. The bilateral negotiations of Macedonia and Greece were mentioned 
as “an important step for those two countries to be discussing the issues that they face 
24 An interesting paper related to the 2010 state of EU enlargement presents the idea of separation of 
bilateral disputes from the accession process. Using examples of Cyprus and Slovenia over Croatia, 
the paper highlights ongoing Croatian disputes with its neighbours and calls for setting Croatia as a 
precedent for such praxis.
25 ibid.
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together as neighbours in the region and as part of Europe”, while Bosnia and Herzego-
vina has been encouraged to “continue to work and implement the necessary legislati-
on and other steps important in moving forward in their EU accession process as well 
as their NATO accession process”.26
The abovementioned examples are a showcase of a continuous strong interest of 
both the EU and the US to continue the integration plans for all Western Balkan co-
untries in the Euro-Atlantic integrations. As Corina Startulat concluded in her paper 
about the necessity of integration of the Balkan countries, “there is too much at stake 
to put Balkan enlargement on hold or drop it from the EU’s political agenda. The inte-
gration of the region with the EU remains the best – if not the only – way to deal with 
outstanding problems. Nothing short of the genuine prospect of full membership – 
including the difficult cases – will guarantee the economic and social modernization, 
as well as the democratic consolidation, of the Balkan countries. Leaving the Balkans 
in a limbo or devising peripheral-type associations in a multi-speed Europe will erode 
hard-won achievements, particularly in terms of peace, stability and democracy, and 
open up space for other ambitious actors (like Russia, Turkey or China) to compete 
with the EU’s influence and vision in the region” (Stratulat, 2012:2).
Special emphasis on the possible bilateral issues among candidate countries – and 
EU experiences of Slovenia blocking the Croatian accession have certainly influenced 
such a concern – shows how there will be very low tolerance for similar behaviour in 
the future. However, potential problems can arise in the future, especially over serio-
us issues that Serbia has over Kosovo. Morton Abramowitz highlights how the main 
unfinished business regarding state-building in the Balkans revolves around Serbia. 
He finds Serbia central to the future of Bosnia and Kosovo and concludes that the re-
gion will not be stable until Serbia makes up its collective mind on these two countries 
– especially Kosovo (Abramowitz, 2011:180). There is also the question of Republika 
Srpska, which remains a persistent bully to the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina – 
where Croatia projects many of its long-term domestic and foreign policy interests. 
The real influence and newfound policy of the EU will also be tested in the ongoing 
dispute of Greece and Macedonia, more prominent in light of a rising Greek nationa-
lism ignited by the economic crisis – where issue of Macedonia can be used to further 
distance Athens from Brussels in the field of domestic-related policies. Such problems 
are the fields where the EU (and the US) will certainly test its patience and readiness 
to continue with the integration policies once the enlargement returns to the agenda.
Everything aforementioned clearly and undoubtedly points how any type of unila-
teral policies should be completely ruled out, not only for Croatia and its relations with 
its neighbours but also among the candidate countries themselves. At this moment 
26 From 2012 P.T. Reeker’s address to journalists in Washington; US Department of State 
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Croatian political actors are displaying a great amount of understanding for the long-
term goals of the EU (and the US) in the region and it can be said that Croatian foreign 
policy has already painted the first lines on brand new canvas of the new phase of its co-
operative and constructive foreign policy. Recent issues regarding the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States that were solved only after 
the EU had threatened Croatia with sanctions after the Croatian government refused 
to remove the limit on the application of the European Arrest Warrant were a showcase 
of Croatian testing of its newfound strength. Without surprise, Croatia announced it 
will amend its laws to fall in line with the EAW laws, but also gave the Croatian policy 
makers an important lesson about the seriousness of actual challenges of foreign policy 
making in the Union.
Much larger challenges are approaching Croatia because of the ongoing economic 
instability within the EU. A plethora of potential problems that will shape the very 
future of Europe through the next decade will bring an additional call for seriousness 
and dedication in achieving the strategic goals of the Union. The example of Slovenia 
has shown how unilateral doings are unwelcome in Brussels. It remains to be seen what 
Croatian policy actors can learn from that recent example in both the short and the 
long run. In July 2013 Croatia reached its long-awaited goal to become a full member of 
the European family. Croatian policy actors should accept the historical responsibility 
and start to pursue the policy that will benefit the interests of Croatia and its citizens 
for the longest period possible. 
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Sažetak
Treba li Hrvatska usmjeriti značajne napore svoje vanjske politike prema su-
sjednim zemljama i njihovom procesu pristupanja u članstvo Europske unije? 
Može li potencijalni zaokret prema proaktivnoj politici pomoći Bosni i Her-
cegovini, Srbiji i Crnoj Gori u procesu pristupanja EU zapravo postati jedna 
od ključnih aktivnosti u uspostavi Hrvatske kao važne nove članice EU, koja 
može djelovati u međusobnom i dugoročnom interesu Unije? Moguća snažna 
suradnja Hrvatske s drugim državama Zapadnog Balkana u njihovom proce-
su pristupanja EU mogao bi biti jedan od najvažnijih potencijalno korisnih 
srednjoročnih ciljeva hrvatske vanjske politike. Takav teoretski pomak fokusa 
mogao bi postati poticaj za ostvarenje željene uloge regionalnog lidera na du-
goročnoj osnovi - pogotovo s obzirom na politiku EU-a i SAD-a i njihovom 
vizijom o budućnosti Jugoistočne Europe i Zapadnog Balkana u narednom 
desetljeću. Jednostrana politika prema susjednim državama kandidatkinja-
ma, koju je provodila Slovenija prema Hrvatskoj tijekom pristupnog procesa 
Hrvatske, treba biti apsolutno isključena zbog vlastitog hrvatskog interesa. 
Namjernim izbjegavanjem bilo kakvih sličnosti s negativnom slikom Slove-
nije zbog načina na koji je tretirala hrvatski pristupni proces, Hrvatska bi se 
trebala predstaviti kao rješavatelj problema, a ne njihov stvaratelj - što će biti 
najbolja dugoročna strategija u pozicioniranju zemlje na novu globalnu mapu 
koje će označiti kraj aktualnoj krizi u ovom području, te postati žarište inte-
resa EU. 
Ključne riječi: Hrvatska, EU, vanjska politika, Balkan, multilateralizam
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